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Abstract. We propose a cryptographic scheme that is deterministic: Alice sends
single photons to Bob, and each and every photon detected supplies one key bit —
no photon is wasted. This is in marked contrast to other schemes in which a random
process decides whether the next photon sent will contribute to the key or not. The
determinism is achieved by preparing the photons in two-qubit states, rather than
the one-qubit states used in conventional schemes. In particular, we consider the
realistic situation in which one qubit is the photon polarization, the other a spatial
alternative. Further, we show how one can exploit the deterministic nature for direct
secure communication, that is: without the need for establishing a shared key first.
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1. Introduction
Cryptographic schemes based on the exchange of single photons, each carrying one bit
of information, have been widely discussed in the literature [1]. In some of the schemes,
Alice and Bob share entangled photon pairs [2]. In others, Bob performs measurements
on photons that Alice sends him [3]. They always need to communicate via a classical
channel as well. Experiments have shown that secure key distribution is possible indeed,
even over a distance of several kilometers [4, 5, 6].
The standard procedures, such as the so-called BB84 protocol of [3], are not
deterministic in the sense that Bob may or may not get a key bit for the next photon that
Alice will send; on average one key bit is obtained for every two photons transmitted‡.
By contrast, the scheme we propose here, is deterministic: Bob gets a key bit for each
and every photon sent by Alice.
This determinism is the main advantage of our new scheme. It offers, in particular,
the option of secure communication without first establishing a shared key.
To achieve the determinism, Alice sends Bob photons prepared in certain two-
qubit states, rather than photons carrying one-qubit states. She uses, for example, the
spatial binary alternative of the photon with the basis states |R〉 and |L〉 and the two
polarization states |v〉 and |h〉. Here, |R〉 and |L〉 describe a photon traveling in the
“right” or the “left” fiber, respectively, and |v〉 and |h〉 refer to photons with vertical
and horizontal polarization.
With the aid of unitary two-qubit gates [8], Alice can turn either one of the simple
product states |Rv〉 = |R〉 ⊗ |v〉, |Rh〉, |Lv〉, and |Lh〉 into any desired superposition
thereof, so that she can send each photon in the single-photon two-qubit state of her
choosing. Likewise, Bob’s measurements of certain sets of four mutually orthogonal
two-qubit states are achieved by appropriate unitary gates. They transform the states
of the measurement basis in question into the four basic product states, which are then
easily discriminated.
Since each photon carries two qubits now, the new scheme is not more efficient in
terms of qubits than the standard ones: Each qubit pair sent gives one key bit.
2. Quantum key distribution
We present the scheme for key distribution first. It has, of course, a number of features
in common with the BB84 protocol, but generates a key bit for every transmitted
photon. We discuss its security against eavesdropping and observe that, despite the
deterministic nature, it cannot be used for direct communication, that is: for sending
a message without establishing a shared key first. We then introduce a second scheme,
with more involved state preparation and analysis, that does enable Alice and Bob to
communicate directly and confidentially.
‡ Only few protocols try to go beyond this 50% efficiency [7].
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Figure 1. Schematic view of the setup. To transmit the bit “+” or “−” Alice prepares
a photon in one of the states |i±〉 and sends it to Bob. For the purpose of cryptography,
two pairs of states are sufficient [e.g., those of (5)], whereas communication requires
four pairs [those of (9)]. A beam splitter reroutes the photon randomly, and then
Bob measures in which state |Bj〉 or |B′j〉 it is. In some cases, communication via the
classical channel is required to decode the bit.
The experimental setup of the cryptographic scheme we propose is sketched in
Fig. 1. To transmit one bit, “+” or “−”, Alice sends Bob a photon prepared in one of
the four states |i±〉 (i = 1, 2). For a “+” bit she chooses randomly between |1+〉 and
|2+〉; for a “−” bit between |1−〉 and |2−〉. When the photon arrives at Bob’s end, he
randomly chooses between two different two-qubit bases for his analysis of the photon
state. Experimentally, this can be achieved by sending the incoming photon through a
beam splitter and rerouting it to different measurement devices as shown in Fig. 1. Bob
measures either the basis states |B1〉, . . . , |B4〉 or |B′1〉, . . . , |B′4〉, and he can always
infer the bit Alice sent. Depending on the outcome of his measurement, he might be
able to deduce the incoming bit immediately. In some cases, classical communication is
required, and Alice has to tell Bob whether the photon state she prepared was of type
“1” or “2”.
For illustration, let us consider the simplest version in which the states sent by
Alice and the states detected by Bob are all product states§ such as
(|1+〉, |1−〉; |2+〉, |2−〉) = (|Rs〉, |La〉; |Sv〉, |Ah〉) ,
(|B1〉, |B2〉, |B3〉, |B4〉) = (|Rv〉, |Rh〉, |Lv〉, |Lh〉) ,
(|B′1〉, |B′2〉, |B′3〉, |B′4〉) = (|Ss〉, |As〉, |Sa〉, |Aa〉) (1)
where
|S〉
|A〉
}
=
1√
2
(|R〉 ± |L〉) , |s〉|a〉
}
=
1√
2
(|v〉 ± |h〉) (2)
§ Therefore, this particular example could also be realized by exploiting the polarization qubits of
paired photons.
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Table 1. For the states of (1): Key bits as inferred by Bob upon learning which type
of photon was sent by Alice. Note that Bob does not need this classical information if
he detects the states of the 1st and 4th columns.
photon sent state detected by Bob
by Alice B1 or B
′
1 B2 or B
′
2 B3 or B
′
3 B4 or B
′
4
type 1 + + − −
type 2 + − + −
are symmetric (S and s) and antisymmetric (A and a) superpositions of the basic
alternatives. Note that each of Bob’s states is orthogonal to either the “+” state or the
“−” state of each pair; this is the essential property for the deterministic transmission.
Suppose, for instance, that Bob detects state |B3〉 = |Lv〉; it is orthogonal to |1+〉 = |Rs〉
and |2−〉 = |Ah〉 and therefore it signifies “−” if a photon of type “1” was sent and “+”
if it was of type “2”. These matters are summarized in Table 1.
Let us now exhibit the basic general features of our deterministic scheme, as they
are illustrated by this particular example. How can Bob always know which bit Alice
sent? He can distinguish the “+” states from the “−” states unambiguously if, for all
state pairs |i+〉/|i−〉, each possible measurement result can only be caused by |i+〉 or
|i−〉, but not by both. This must be the case for every basis measured by Bob. Then
he can infer the bit transmitted as soon as Alice identifies the type of pair used (that
is: she tells him the value of the pair label i).
For the security of the scheme it is important that the state pairs |1±〉 and |2±〉
sent by Alice are neither identical nor orthogonal. It is equally important that Bob has
more than one basis at his disposal, because this is what renders possible the detection
of an eavesdropper. In the example (1), the two bases are in fact even complementary
since the transition probabilities |〈Bi|B′j〉|2 = 14 do not depend on the quantum numbers
i, j. This maximal incompatibility is not really needed, but the bases should not be
very similar to each other in order to ensure that an eavesdropper will surely cause a
substantial number of false detections at Bob’s end, as we discuss below.
To analyze this in more detail, we consider a scheme that is somewhat more general
than the one based on the products states (1). Here Bob’s bases are related to each
other by
(|B′1〉, |B′2〉, |B′3〉, |B′4〉) = (|B1〉, |B2〉, |B3〉, |B4〉)K (3)
where the 4× 4 matrix K is given by
K =
1
1 + k2


1 k k k2
k k2 −1 −k
k −1 k2 −k
k2 −k −k 1

 (4)
with a real parameter k. For brevity and simplicity, we are satisfied with discussing the
most elementary version of the scheme, where Alice makes use of two state pairs only
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that are given by
|1+〉 = (|B1〉+ k|B2〉)/
√
1 + k2 ,
|1−〉 = (k|B3〉 − |B4〉)/
√
1 + k2 ,
|2+〉 = (|B1〉+ k|B3〉)/
√
1 + k2 ,
|2−〉 = (k|B2〉 − |B4〉)/
√
1 + k2 , (5)
More generally, she could always use four pairs, and even six pairs in some versions [9].
Relations (5) remain valid if the |Bj〉’s are replaced by the |B′j〉’s. Note that the inverse
of the transformation (3) is also furnished by K since this matrix is both Hermitian and
unitary. For k = 1, in particular, we return to the situation of (1) where the two bases
|Bj〉 and |B′j〉 are complementary. Table 1 continues to apply, irrespective of the value
of k.
Let us now imagine that Evan, the eavesdropper, is listening in. He intercepts each
photon sent by Alice, performs a measurement on it, and then forwards a replacement
photon to Bob. Evan will not be able to infer with certainty which two-qubit state is
carried by the intercepted photon, and so he has to make an educated guess based on
his measurement result. Then he prepares the replacement photon accordingly, namely
in the two-qubit state that has the best chance of avoiding wrong detector clicks at
Bob’s end. If, for instance, Alice has sent a |1+〉 photon, then the detectors for |B3〉
and |B4〉 as well as |B′3〉 and |B′4〉 would yield wrong clicks and reveal the interference
of the eavesdropper. Thus, Evan has to solve a two-fold problem: Which basis should
he measure, and which states should be forwarded to Bob, such that the probability for
a wrong click is minimal?
These questions can be answered systematically [9], also for more general intercept-
resend strategies, much like the corresponding studies [10] for the BB84 protocol. (The
generalizations do not offer a real advantage to Evan, however.) In an optimal strategy
then, the probability that Bob will detect a wrong click is
p
(2)
min =
1
2
− 1
2
√
1 + k4
1 + k2
. (6)
All other intercept-resend strategies that Evan might employ result in larger error rates.
The largest value obtains for k = ±1, namely p(2)min = (2−
√
2)/4 = 14.6%; for k = 0 and
k → ±∞ the minimal error rate vanishes. Both limiting cases are easily understood:
for k = ±1 Bob’s measurement bases are complementary and therefore maximally
incompatible, and for k = 0 or k → ±∞ they are essentially identical. We note in
passing that, if four pairs of states are used rather than just the two pairs of (5), the
minimal error rate increases to
p
(4)
min =
1
2
min{1, k2}
1 + k2
, (7)
which can be as large as 25%, and an eavesdropper’s presence can then be noticed more
easily.
For the purposes of this letter, we continue to focus on the two-pair scheme and
assume that Alice and Bob have wisely chosen a k value near k = 1, say. Suppose they
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want to establish a key of 1000 bits, and Alice sends 1100 photons in two-qubit states,
randomly chosen from the four states of (5). Bob detects all photons, then selects a
random subset of 100 and tells Alice in which states he found them. If some of Bob’s
measurement results are inconsistent with the states Alice sent, such as detecting |B′3〉
for a |1+〉 photon, then Alice doesn’t trust the transmission and they start all over. If,
however, Bob’s results are all right, then Alice concludes that the likelihood that Evan
has listened in is less than (1 − p(2)min)100 = 1.3 × 10−7, which she and Bob have earlier
decided to be sufficiently small for the security level they’d like to have. Alice then
reveals the type of each photon, “1” or “2”, and Bob infers the bits sent with the aid of
Table 1. Thereafter they share a secure 1000-bit key string. A confidential message of
this length can then be exchanged.
3. Secure communication without first establishing a shared key
Given the deterministic nature of the scheme, one might wonder if Alice couldn’t send
a message directly to Bob without first establishing a shared cryptographic key. That
would require that Evan cannot infer the transmitted bits before Alice and Bob become
aware of his presence. Now, Table 1 tells us that Evan could acquire correct knowledge
of every second bit sent by just performing the same measurements as Bob because
knowledge of the photon type is not needed in the 1st and 4th columns. In fact, Evan
can improve his educated guesses by choosing his measurement more cleverly [9], since
the “+” states sent by Alice are distributed differently over the two-qubit Hilbert space
than the “−” states. For the example of (5), he can systematically exploit the difference
between the two-dimensional subspaces spanned by the “+” states and the “−” states to
achieve odds as large as 1
2
+ 1
2
/
√
1 + k2 for guessing the bits right, which exceeds 85% for
k = 1. Clearly, secure direct communication is not possible under these circumstances.
But there is a modified scheme that does enable Alice and Bob to communicate
directly and confidentially. Again we focus on the simplest version, in which Bob’s
measurement bases are related to each other by

〈B1|
〈B2|
〈B3|
〈B4|

 =
i√
3


0 1 1 1
−1 0 −1 1
−1 1 0 −1
−1 −1 1 0




〈B′1|
〈B′2|
〈B′3|
〈B′4|

 . (8)
Just like K of (4), the 4 × 4 transformation matrix appearing here is Hermitian and
unitary, so that it also furnishes the inverse transformation. The states sent by Alice
now are identical with Bob’s basis states, grouped into four pairs of orthogonal states
in accordance with
|i+〉 = |Bi〉 , |i−〉 = |B′i〉 for i = 1, 2, 3, 4 . (9)
The basic features discussed above in the paragraphs between (2) and (3) are here
present as well.
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Table 2. For the states of (8) and (9): Key bits as inferred by Bob upon learning
which type of photon was sent by Alice.
photon sent state detected by Bob
by Alice B1 B2 B3 B4 B
′
1
B′
2
B′
3
B′
4
type 1 + − − − − + + +
type 2 − + − − + − + +
type 3 − − + − + + − +
type 4 − − − + + + + −
Table 3. Direct confidential communication. Alice chooses a random key sequence
of 1, 2, 3, 4 (1st row) and matches it with the bit sequence of the message (2nd row)
interspersed with randomly located control bits (boxed) to determined the sequence of
states to be sent (3rd row). Bob obtains a sequence of detected states (4th row). The
control bits are used to test for the presence of an eavesdropper. After Alice reveals
the random sequence of the 1st row, Bob can then reconstruct the message of the 2nd
row.
Alice’s key 1 3 4 4 1 2 1 3 3 · · ·
message + + − − − + − + − · · ·
states sent 1+ 3+ 4− 4− 1− 2+ 1− 3+ 3− · · ·
Bob finds B1 B
′
1 B
′
4 B2 B2 B
′
4 B4 B3 B
′
3 · · ·
How Bob infers the bits sent is summarized in Table 2. Consider, for example, that
he found a certain photon in state |B3〉. He’ll infer that “+” was sent if Alice tells him
that it was a type-3 photon because |B3〉 is orthogonal to |3−〉, and that “−” was sent
if it was of type 1, 2, or 4 because |B3〉 is orthogonal to |1+〉, |2+〉, and |4+〉.
Now, the minimal error rate resulting from eavesdropping of the intercept-resend
kind is 1
6
= 16.7% for (9) with (8), which is less than the 25% of the four-pair key-sharing
scheme to which (7) refers, but more than the 14.6% of the two-pair version‖. Thus,
Evan’s interference can be detected just as easily in the present scheme of (9) and (8)
as in the previous one of (5) and (3) or of (1). Therefore, the scheme defined by (8) and
(9) could be used for secure key distribution.
But this scheme is also well suited for direct communication, since the four “+”
states span the whole two-qubit Hilbert space uniformly, and the four “−” states do so
as well. Thus, Evan cannot distinguish “+” photons from “−” photons here without
knowing the photon type. In particular, although the columns of Table 2 have 3:1 ratios
of the signs, both kinds carry equal weight. If, for example, |B3〉 is detected then |3+〉
is as likely as |1−〉, |2−〉, and |4−〉 together.
Direct confidential communication is achieved as follows; see Table 3. Step one:
‖ These error rates refer to the situation in which Evan wishes to find out the value of each bit
transmitted. Instead, he could settle for just a reasonable likelihood for guessing the bit value right
and bargain for a reduced error rate in return. A detailed discussion of compromises of this kind will
be presented elsewhere.
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Alice generates, at her end, a random sequence of 1, 2, 3, 4 that will serve as the
cryptographic key. Only Alice knows this key. Step two: She matches this sequence
with the string of +/− message bits, interspersed with a fair number of control bits
at random positions, and so determines the two-qubit states to be sent to Bob. Only
Alice knows which bits are control bits and which are message bits. Step three: Alice
sends the photons in these states, and Bob detects them in one of the states of his
measurement bases. Step four: Alice tells Bob which photons carried control bits, and
he tells her in which state he found them. Step five: Alice verifies that Bob’s findings
are consistent with what she sent. If no inconsistencies — that is: errors — are noticed,
Alice concludes that the transmission was secure and continues with step six; otherwise
she repeats the procedure beginning with step one. Step six: Alice reveals the key
sequence of step one, and Bob reconstructs the message with the aid of Table 2.
This scheme for direct communication is secure because Alice does not reveal her key
sequence until she has convinced herself that Evan has not been listening in. Without
this classical information, Evan cannot infer a single bit of the message. The only bits
he might decode before his presence is detected are the control bits which, however, are
not part of the confidential message.
4. Final remarks
Experimental implementations of our schemes for key distribution and direct
communication can be realized with the aid of the universal two-qubit gates that where
introduced recently [8]. Concerning practical aspects, we remark that we gain a factor
of two compared to other cryptography schemes even for imperfect transmission and
detection. Redundant encoding can overcome the losses in the communication scheme
without revealing information to the eavesdropper. We’d also like to note that, rather
than using two binary alternatives of single photons, one could, of course, equally well
exploit the states of any other four-dimensional Hilbert space.
In summary, we propose a new cryptographic scheme. Under ideal conditions, the
scheme is deterministic: Alice and Bob get a key bit for each photon sent, whereas
other schemes [2, 3] need at least two photons and are not deterministic. A significant
percentage of Bob’s measurement results will be wrong if an eavesdropper intercepts
the transmission, so that his presence can surely be noticed. In addition, we show how
the encoding and deterministic decoding of qubits in a four-dimensional Hilbert space
allows direct communication, even without first establishing a shared key.
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